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Good International Citizenship and Special Responsibilities to Protect Refugeesi 
Abstract 
Good international citizenship is generally seen, either implicitly or explicitly, as being a 
matter of fulfilling general duties in the realm of foreign policy. In this article, I challenge 
this prevailing view, by arguing that good international citizenship frequently involves 
discharging special responsibilities to protect, which in turn involves grants of asylum to 
refugees. While arguing that asylum should be seen as an important element of good 
international citizenship as a matter of course, it assumes an even more central role in this 
citizenship in two scenarios. The first is where humanitarian intervention is either imprudent 
or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of international society. The 
second is when intervention ± whether pursued for humanitarian or other reasons ± creates 
refugees, and intervening states may thereby acquire special responsibilities to protect those 
refugees. 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the notion of good international citizenship has developed within political 
and academic discourse in liberal-democratic states as a framework with which to assess the 
HWKLFV RI VWDWHV¶ IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV 2ULJLQDWLQJ LQ &DQDGian politics during the 1960s (Pert 
2014, 4), and championed by the former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (Evans 
1989), it has since been elaborated by international relations theorists in the English School 
tradition, who posit the existence of an international society of states (e.g. Dunne 2008; 
Linklater 1992; Linklater 2000; Linklater and Suganami 2006, ch. 7; Wheeler and Dunne
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1998). There now exists a consensus that the basic content of good international citizenship 
involves a strong commitment to human rights, multilateralism, and international law, 
including the responsibility to protect (R2P). In short, good international citizens are 
committed to the common rules and values governing the international society of which they 
are members. 
Despite this basic consensus, a residual indeterminacy within the concept persists. 
,QGHHGWKHVLPSOHYDJXHQHVVRIWKHWHUPµJRRG¶PHDQVWKDWDQ\XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWJRRG
international citizenship is and entails will, in the abstract, be contingent on whatever one 
FRQVLGHUV µJRRG¶ VWDWH FRQGXFW LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VSKHUH WR EH :LOOLDPV  -43). 
Although there is no expectation that states be perfect in order to qualify as good 
international citizens, it remains unclear how demanding good international citizenship 
should be taken to be, as well as how states should seek to balance and prioritise their often 
competing responsibilities towards their own citizens, other states, and non-citizens. 
Although scholars have not addressed these issues and ambiguities in as much depth as they 
might have done ± tending as they have done to raise them rather than systematically 
attempting to resolve them ± some have sought to convert this impression of slight 
slipperiness around the concept into a virtue. Jonathan Gilmore, for instance, has recently 
DUJXHGWKDWZKLOHWKHFRQFHSWFDQQRWRIIHUDQ\µREMHFWLYHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶RIZKHQDEDODQFH
EHWZHHQ D VWDWHV¶ YDULRXV UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV KDV EHHQ DFKLHYHG LW PD\ QHYHUWKHOHVV DFW DV D
µGLVFXUVLYH IUDPHZRUN¶ WKURXJK ZKLFK WKH µFRQWLQXLWLHV DQG WHQVLRQV¶ EHWZHHQ WKHVH
responsibilities can be explored (Gilmore 2015, 107-108). While this indeterminacy is, in 
common with all moral concepts, not entirely eliminable, leaving it unaddressed opens the 
door to under-demanding interpretations of what good international citizenship entails, 
ZKLFKPD\ZHOOKDYHWKHHIIHFWRIMXVWLI\LQJVWDWHV¶H[LVWLQJSROLFLHVWKDW  are in fact highly 
problematic.ii 
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This residual indeterminacy is also partly due to the relatively narrow framing of the 
concept to date, and to the fact that scholars have not analysed the notion in light of the full 
range of moral and legal obligations that states can bear both towards each other and to 
individuals within international society. What is striking in most discussions of good 
international citizenship is the extent to which principles of good international citizenship are 
largely framed, at least implicitly, in terms of general duties ± that is, as duties that arise by 
YLUWXH RI HDFK VWDWH¶V PHPEHUVKLS LQ DQ Lnternational society of states ± and as pertaining 
VROHO\ RU PRVWO\ WR VWDWHV¶ IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV ,Q WKLV DUWLFOH , VXJJHVW WKDW RQH ZD\ RI
sharpening the concept is to recognise explicitly the role of special responsibilities and 
domestic practices such as asylum policy in the practice of good international citizenship. 
Whereas scholars who have theorised good international citizenship have contributed to 
recent important work on special responsibilities in world politics (Bukovansky et al. 2012; 
Dunne 2013), they have not made explicit connections between the two concepts. Although 
good international citizenship and asylum policy have been related to one other, mostly in the 
context of Australian politics ± ZKHUH FODLPV WR $XVWUDOLD¶V JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLtizen 
credentials have sat uneasily with its draconian asylum policies in recent years ± detailed 
general principles of good international citizenship in the domain of asylum have yet to be 
elaborated. Given that special responsibilities are standardly seen as being more demanding 
than general duties, showing the relevance of special responsibilities for good international 
citizenship can help to ensure that the concept acts as a critical yardstick, where necessary, 
ZLWKZKLFKWRMXGJHVWDWHV¶H[LVWLQJSROLcies. 
In order to make this case, this article is structured in three parts. In the first part, I 
outline the notion of good international citizenship and the role it has played in normative 
debates in international relations theory to date. In the second part, I make a general case for 
linking good international citizenship and special responsibilities, arguing that practices of 
4 
 
special responsibilities are not confined to great powers, but rather that the assignment and 
shouldering of such responsibilities should be seen as part of the proactivity expected of all 
good international citizens. Just as citizens who enjoy formal equality within a state can 
acquire differentiated obligations as a result of their actions, so too can states, especially 
where the harmful effects of their actions will be borne by other states or individuals if left 
unrectified. I also suggest that recognising the role of special responsibilities within good 
international citizenship can help to guard against an overly static view of what this 
citizenship is and entails, for it brings into view the ways in which states may gain, lose and 
re-gain their status as good international citizens by causing and rectifying the harms they 
cause. 
In the third part, I suggest that, while asylum should be seen as a key element of good 
international citizenship as a matter of course, it becomes an even more central aspect of this 
citizenship in two scenarios where humanitarian intervention is unable to deliver effective 
protection to those at risk from atrocities. The first is where humanitarian intervention is 
imprudent or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of international 
society. In such a scenario, I suggest, good international citizens bear a duty to reshape norms 
such as R2P. The second is where intervention (whether pursued for humanitarian or other 
reasons) creates refugees, and intervening states may thereby acquire special responsibilities to 
protect those refugees through asylum. In this kind of case, I suggest, leaving third-party states 
to take up the slack and offer asylum to those refugees constitutes an inter-state injustice that is 
incompatible with such citizenship. While discussions of good international citizenship, 
especially from those writing from a solidarist perspective, have emphasised the role of 
humanitarian intervention in upholding human rights, I argue that the practical limitations of 
such intervention require recognition of the role of asylum in this citizenship. In so doing, I 
aim to pave the way towards an account of good international citizenship that is more sensitive 
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to the harmful consequences that often flow from humanitarian intervention. I also show how 
attending to the currently skewed distribution of responsibilities to protect refugees across 
international society challenges the close association between good international citizenship 
and Western liberal-GHPRFUDWLF VWDWHV JLYHQ WKDW WKH PDMRULW\ RI WKH ZRUOG¶V UHIXJHHV DUH
hosted by states within the global South. 
 
The Good International Citizen Revisited 
The notion of good international citizenship has often been considered to be a critical 
tool ± ZKHWKHUE\SURYLGLQJ µVRPHEDVLFPRUDOFULWHULD¶ /LQNODWHU D µFRQFHSWXDO
UDWLRQDOH¶:KHHOHUDQG'XQQHDµOLWPXV WHVW¶:KHHOHUDQG'XQQHD
µEHQFKPDUN¶%XOOHUDQG+DUULVRQDµGLVFXUVLYHIUDPHZRUN¶*LOPRUH
RU D µVWDQGDUG RI EHKDYLRXU¶ 3HUW   ± IRU HYDOXDWLQJ VWDWHV¶ IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV 7KH
concept sits among a cluster of cognate terms, including internationalism (Dunne and 
0F'RQDOGDQGWKHµJRRGVWDWH¶ /DZOHUDQGKDVODUJHO\EHHQGHYHORSHG
within, and applied to, liberal-democratic middle powers (Lightfoot 2006, 457). Although the 
concept has assumed its most prominent role in political discourse in Australia, scholars have 
XVHG WKH WHUP WR DVVHVV WKH 8.¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GXULQJ WKH %ODLU \HDUV VHH %XOOHU DQG
Harrison 2000; Gilmore 2015; Vickers 2000; Wheeler and Dunne 1998), as well as that of 
South Africa (Graham 2008) and the Nordic states (Lawler 2005). However, there appears to 
be weaker consensus over whether the application of the term should be confined to such 
liberal middle powers. While some have viewed good international citizenship as flowing 
from the self-image of liberal states (Evans and Grant 1991, 34-35), others have left open the 
possibility that any state may act as good international citizen (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 
231), including great powers such as the United States (Ralph 2009), as well as regional 
bodies such as the European Union (Dunne 2008; Siniver and Cabrera 2015).iii 
6 
 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a broad consensus that the principal characteristics of 
good international citizens include a strong commitment to human rights, multilateralism and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ,Q /LQNODWHU¶V FODVVLF LQWURGXFWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV
WKHRU\ KH DUJXHG WKDW HDFK JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQ LV µSUHSDUHG WR SXW WKH ZHOIDUH RI
international society ahead of the relentlesV SXUVXLW RI LWV RZQ QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶ /LQNODWHU
1992, 28), which Wheeler and Dunne (1998, 868) later articulated as a willingness to 
µ>VDFULILFH@ WKH SXUVXLW RI QDUURZ HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO DGYDQWDJHV LQ WKH FDXVH RI
promoting international standards RI KXPDQ ULJKWV¶ ,Q UHFHQW GHFDGHV JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
citizenship has, thanks to the advocacy of Gareth Evans, become closely associated with the 
GRFWULQHVRI µVRYHUHLJQW\ DV UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶DQG53 ,QGHHG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLVVLRQ
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001, 8) ± which, co-chaired by Evans, first 
articulated R2P ± viewed a willingness to uphold 53 DV µWKH PLQLPXP FRQWHQW RI JRRG
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQVKLS¶ ,Q LWV FRPPLWPHQW WR PXOWLODWHUDOLVP PRUHRYHU HDFK JRRG
international citi]HQ LV H[SHFWHG WR µSXQFK LWV ZHLJKW¶ 6LQLYHU DQG &DEUHUD   RU
µSLWFKLQ¶3HUWLQLQWHUQDWLRQDODIIDLUV 
Moreover, a distinction can be drawn between domain-specific and overall good 
international citizenship. Scholars have applied the framework of good international 
citizenship to a variety of policy domains and issue areas ± such as humanitarian intervention 
(Linklater 2000), R2P (Youde and Slagter 2013), environmental policy (Lightfoot 2006), 
arms sales (Wheeler and Dunne 1998), the Middle East peace process (Siniver and Cabrera 
2015), the International Criminal Court (Ralph 2007), and universal jurisdiction (Ralph 
2009) ± although not to asylum and refugee protection in any depth. In discussions of 
internationalism and good internatioQDOFLWL]HQVKLSFDSLWDOLVPUHPDLQVLQ%XUNH¶VZRUGVµD
vast and deeply problemDWLFVLOHQFH¶%XUNH 
The relationship of good international citizenship to the different principles that can 
underpin international society perhaps remains to some extent unclear. Normative English 
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School theory has been characterised by a debate between pluralism and solidarism. Perhaps at 
the risk of over-simplification, pluralist norms prioritise international order and focus on 
principles of state sovereignty, self-determination, non-interference and co-existence among 
states, while solidarist norms prioritise matters of justice and are principally concerned with 
the rights of individuals within international society.iv Whereas good international citizenship 
has been characterised as lying between the poles of pluralism and solidarism (Gilmore 2015, 
109), it is possible to tailor principles of good international citizenship to fit international 
societies in which either pluralist or solidarist norms are dominant (see Dunne 2008, 21-25; 
Linklater and Suganami 2006, ch. 7). In a pluralist international society, good international 
citizenship would largely consist of contributing to what Molly Cochran (2008, 286) has 
GHVFULEHG DV µUHVSRQVLEOH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VRFLHW\ PDQDJHPHQW¶ E\ SULRULWLVLQJ RUGHU EHWZHHQ
states, whereas in a solidarist international society good international citizenship would go 
well beyond this to include at least some degree of cosmopolitan concern for the human rights 
RI WKH ZRUOG¶V SRSXODWLRQ ZKHWKHU WKDW LV IRUPXODWHG LQ WHUPV RI UHVSHFW IRU WKH µKDUP
SULQFLSOH¶RU µFRVPRSROLWDQKDUPFRQYHQWLRQV¶ /LQNODWHU DQG6XJDQDPL FK:KLOH
pluralism implicitly offers a relatively thin understanding of what citizenship in international 
society involves ± JLYHQWKDWLQ'XQQH¶VZRUGVSOXUDOLVPµPDLQWDLQVWKDWFXOWXUDOGLYHUVLW\LV
a practical and moral barrier to the pursuit of collective moral purposes other than maintaining 
RUGHU¶ 'XQQH± solidarism sets out a thicker conception of what it means to be a 
good international citizen. 
Good international citizenship also reflects the broader English School theory in 
ZKLFK LW LV HPEHGGHGE\ UHSUHVHQWLQJD µPLGGOH-JURXQGHWKLFV¶ &RFKUDQRUD µWKLUG
ZD\¶ :KHHOHU DQG 'XQQH   What sits between the poles of realism and 
cosmopolitanism, and pragmatism and idealism. As Andrew Linklater has put it, good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQVKLS µSURPLVHV WR RYHUFRPH WKDW FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ FLWL]HQVKLS DQG
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humanity which has been such a recurrent feature of the theory and practice of international 
UHODWLRQV¶ /LQNODWHU   5DWKHU WKDQ HLWKHU DVVHUWLQJ WKDW HWKLFV LV LQDSSOLFDEOH WR
international politics at one extreme, or calling for the dismantling of the states system at the 
other, the framework of good international citizenship sees states as faced with distinct sets of 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV QDPHO\ µQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ WR WKHLU RZQ FLWL]HQV µLQWHUQDWLRQDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ WRZDUGV RWKHU VWDWHV DQG µKXPDQLWDULDQ UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ WRZDUGV LQGLYLduals, 
wherever they may reside (Jackson 2000, 170; Ralph 2007, 78-79). Some discussions of the 
concept suggest that the potential tensions between these distinct responsibilities can be 
reconciled, and that, as Tony Blair (1999) famously put itµYDOXHVDQGLQWHUHVWVPHUJH¶*DUHWK
(YDQV IRU LQVWDQFH KDV FRQWHQGHG WKDW µEHLQJ DQG EHLQJ VHHQ WR EH D JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
FLWL]HQ¶LVSDUWRIWKHµQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶(YDQV 
To be sure, the role of good international citizenship as an ethical middle-ground sets 
limits on its ability to play a strong role in any truly radical political project, and various 
VFKRODUV KDYH REVHUYHG LWV µPRGHVW¶ FKDUDFWHU /DZOHU   RU UHODWLYH µFRQVHUYDWLVP¶
(Williams 2002, 46), given its ultimately state-centric approach (Burke 2013; Cabrera 2010, 
,QGHHGLWPD\EHWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶LQJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSWKDWOLPLWVLWVUDGLFDO
SRWHQWLDO VXFK WKDW VWDWHV ZRXOG QHHG WR µJR EH\RQG¶ WKH GHPDQGV RI JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
citizenship in order to become full-blooded cosmopolitan states (Shapcott 2013, 139; see also 
&DEUHUD,QFRQWUDVWD³JRRGworld FLWL]HQ´ZRXOGEHDEOHWRDFWLQPRUHWKRURXJKO\
cosmopolitan ways.v Nevertheless, the concept retains significant progressive potential 
(Cabrera 2010, 5), especially in its solidarist renderings, whether one believes that good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSLVµEXWDZD\VWDWLRQRQWKHURDGWRWKHUHDOLVDWLRQRIDQDXWKHQWLFDOO\
FRVPRSROLWDQPRUDOLW\ZLWKLQDXQLYHUVDOFRPPXQLW\RIKXPDQNLQG¶RU LV µDSHUHQQLDO IRUP¶
(Lawler 2013, 21), given the propensity of actual states to only selectively adhere to the norms 
of good international citizenship. However, this progressive potential depends in part on 
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DGGUHVVLQJWKHFRQFHSW¶VUHVLGXDOLQGHWHUPLQDF\QRWHGDEove, thereby ensuring that it can act 
DVDFULWLFDO\DUGVWLFNDJDLQVWZKLFKWRMXGJHVWDWHV¶DFWLRQV 
 
Good International Citizenship and Special Responsibilities 
In political philosophy, a standard distinction is made between general duties and 
special reVSRQVLELOLWLHV :KLOH JHQHUDO GXWLHV DUH WKRVH µZH KDYH WR SHRSOH DV VXFK¶ VSHFLDO
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDUHWKRVHWKDWµZHKDYHRQO\WRZDUGSDUWLFXODUSHRSOHZLWKZKRPZHKDYHKDG
certain significant sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in certain significant sorts of 
UHODWLRQV¶6FKHIIOHU6SHFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDUHRIWHQWKRXJKWRIDVEHLQJVWURQJHU
than general duties, at least in cases where the two conflict (Kagan 1988, 293; Pogge 2002, 
207; Scheffler 2001, 87). In the context of international society, states may bear special 
responsibilities on a number of distinct grounds. In addition to their special responsibilities 
towards their own citizens, states may bear special responsibilities to non-citizens on the basis 
of transnational ties such as historical association (Ypi, Goodin and Barry 2009); any 
particular roles they may have assumed within international society, such as permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council (Clark and Reus-Smit 2013); the fact that they have 
harmed outsiders and owe them reparation (Butt 2009); or by virtue of their simple capability 
(Bukovanksy et al. 2012). 
'HVSLWHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHVSHFLDOµPDQDJHULDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶RIJUHDWSRZHUVZLWKLQ
English School thinking (Bull 1977, 194), the literature specifically on good international 
citizenship to date makes only brief and sporadic reference to the concept of special 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGKDVOLPLWHGLWVIRFXVWRVWDWHV¶VSHFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRUµILGXFLDU\GXWLHV¶
towards their own citizens (Siniver and Cabrera 2015, 214), or those flowing from their 
capabilities (Linklater 1992, 29; Linklater and Suganami 2006: 238).vi It might, however, be 
argued that this neglect of special responsibilities within specific discussions of good 
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international citizenship is for good reason: good international citizenship should be solely or 
ODUJHO\GHILQHGE\JHQHUDOGXWLHV7KHFRQFHSW¶V IRXQGDWLRQ LQ(QJOLVK6FKRRO WKHRU\PLJKW
be thought to make clear why this is so. If good international citizenship specifies the 
principles of ethical state conduct in international relations that arise from HDFK VWDWH¶V
membership of international society of states then, it could be argued, there is a close 
conceptual link between good international citizenship and general duties. The challenges 
facing international society at any given time are to be shared among its members and, in this 
ZD\JRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\DERXWµGRLQJRQH¶VELW¶WRDGGUHVVWKHVH
problems and to maintain order within the international system. As Vickers (2000, 42) has 
FRPPHQWHG µD IRFXV RQ JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQVKLS DQG WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\
VXJJHVWV VRPH QRWLRQ RI HTXDOLW\ EHWZHHQ FLWL]HQV¶ :KHUHDV JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQVKLS
has, as I observed earlier, largely been applied to middle powers, the language of special 
responsibilities may seem more at home in the context of great power politics, where special 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV VHHP WR IORZ IURP WKH PD[LP WKDW µZLWK JUHDW SRZHU FRPHV JUHDW
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶%XNRYDQVN\HWDO012), 246). Viewed in this light, the assignment of special 
responsibilities to states within international society is to go beyond the requirements of good 
international citizenship. Good international citizenship and special responsibilities are, on 
this view, both highly significant within international affairs, but the two are analytically 
distinct. 
There is, however, an important counterargument to this line of thought, which 
demonstrates that special responsibilities should be seen as forming an integral part of good 
international citizenship. When states act within the context of international society, engaging 
as they do in a range of actions of different sorts, this clearly affects not only other states, but 
also the individuals within those states. If harmful, the costs of these actions will often fall on 
other states or individuals, unless that is compensated for through further remedial action by the 
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state that caused the harm. To fail to redress these harms would be to allow the costs of these 
actions to fall on individuals whose basic interests may be set back as a result, or on other states 
that step in and take up the slack for other states, while those states responsible for the harm 
effectively free-ULGHRQWKHVHRWKHUV¶HIIRUWV7KLVLQHTXLWDEOHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHFRVWVRIVWDWHV¶
actions is clearly a matter of ethics within the international society of states. Just as, on the 
domestic level, the equality of citizens does not prevent the state from demanding that 
individual citizens pay compensation and offer redress for foreseeable harms they have caused 
± even, under doctrines of strict liability within tort law, when acting justifiably (Honoré 1999, 
ch. 2) ± states may also be required within international society to do the same. I illustrate this 
point in the final section with the example of how the distribution of the costs of international 
UHIXJHHSURWHFWLRQKDVWUDFNHGVWDWHV¶VSHFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWRZDUGVUHIXJHHVRQO\WRDYHU\
limited extent in recent years. 
Moreover, recognition of the formal sovereign equality of states within international 
society should not lead us to conclude that good international citizenship must be viewed as a 
matter of discharging general duties. As Bukovansky and colleagues have persuasively argued, 
µLdeas and practices of special responsibilities come to the fore, and assume particular 
importance, in international orders where either sovereign equality or material power politics, 
each on their own, provides an inadequate basis on which to address challenges of coexistence 
DQGFRRSHUDWLRQ¶%XNRYDQVN\HWDO3DUWRIZKDWLWPHDQVWREHDJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDO
citizen should be to take an active part in the assignment of special responsibilities in order to 
tackle such challenges effectively, and to assume some of those special responsibilities where 
QHFHVVDU\ZKLFKILWVUHDGLO\ZLWKWKHQRWLRQWKDWHDFKJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKRXOGµSXQFK
LWVZHLJKW¶6LQLYHUDQG&DEUHUD$OWKRXJK9LFNHUVKDVFKDUDFWHULVHGWKH
good interQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶VUHVSHFWIRULQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDVµDUDWKHUSDVVLYHVWDQFHWRIRUHLJQ
DIIDLUV¶WKHYDOXHVRIµOHDGHUVKLS¶DQGµSURDFWLYLW\¶3HUWWKDWDUHWREHIRXQGZLWKLQ
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assertions of good international citizenship by politicians, such as Evans, means that a 
willingness to assign and accept special responsibilities among members of international 
society can readily be seen as a part of good international citizenship. 
The incorporation of special responsibilities into a conception of good international 
citizenship can also help to guard against a rather static view of what it means to be such a 
FLWL]HQ,IWKHµKDUPSULQFLSOH¶LVDV/LQNODWHUDQG6XJDQDPLFKKDYHVXJJHVWHGDQ
important element of good international citizenship, then states that cause harm beyond their 
borders unjustifiably, and then fail to redress those harms, cannot properly be classed as good 
international citizens. A focus on special responsibilities that flow from the principle of 
reparation can bring to light the ways in which states may gain, lose and regain their status as 
good international citizens, by causing harm and injustice and redressing it (or not, as the case 
may be). This focus on special responsibilities allows us to appreciate the means through 
which states that have deviated from the norms of good international citizenship ± which is to 
say all states at one point or another ± can make amends and thereby re-enter the fold of good 
international citizens once more, or even perhaps enter it for the first time. 
It might be claimed that, while special responsibilities based on considerations such as 
capability or DVWDWH¶V position within international society can be readily incorporated into the 
framework of good international citizenship ± given that capability will at least partly be 
determined by whether a state is able to pursue cosmopolitan ends once it has also fulfilled its 
duties towards its own nationals and to other states ± reparative duties may pose a tougher 
challenge for the concept. Some reparative duties can be discharged by states without 
jeopardisLQJWKHLUµYLWDOLQWHUHVWV¶, provided the harm they caused to non-citizens was limited. 
However, if historical injustices, such as large-scale practices of colonialism and slavery, are 
taken into consideration then, it could be argued, the framework of good international 
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citizenship might collapse under their weight, so to speak, as the need for reparation demands 
sacrifices that are inFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶VPDLQWHQDnce of a balance 
between cosmopolitan duties and the national interest.vii Whereas states may be entitled to 
prioritise the welfare of their citizens over the assistance of vulnerable strangers where those 
states are not implicated in this vulnerability, reparative duties are less sensitive to 
considerations of cost (Bukovansky et al. 2012, 219-220). While a full discussion of how 
extensive duties to redress historical injustices are goes beyond the scope of this article, it may 
be that the viability of good international citizenship as an ethical framework ultimately 
depends on the elision of such injustices. Nevertheless, discharging special responsibilities 
WRZDUGV UHIXJHHV JHQHUDWHGE\ VWDWHV¶ recent military interventions, which form the focus of 
this article, may well impose significant costs, but are less likely to be so onerous as to 
threaten WKH UHVSRQVLEOH VWDWHV¶ µYLWDO LQWHUHVWV¶, and so are more easily incorporated into the 
good international citizen frame. 
Bringing Good International Citizenship Home 
The second feature of existing discussions of good international citizenship that I seek 
to challenge in this article is the view that this citizenship is solely or mainly a matter of 
foreign affairs. Linklater (1992, 39) is typical in this regard, and set the trend of subsequent 
GLVFXVVLRQLQKLVYLHZWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSµVHWVRXWVRPHEDVLF
FULWHULD ZKLFK FDQ EH XVHG WR MXGJH DQG FULWLFLVH WKH VWDWH¶V FRQGXFW RI foreign policy¶
(emphasis added). This is not to say that there has been no recognition of links between good 
international citizenship and domestic policy in issue areas such as asylum, however. Given 
the apparent contradiction EHWZHHQ$XVWUDOLD¶VFODLPVWRJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSDQGits 
draconian policy of detaining asylum seekers in off-shore processing centres, some scholars 
and commentators have pointed out in passing that this asylum policy at the very least calls 
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LQWR TXHVWLRQ $XVWUDOLD¶V VWDWXV DV D JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQ 'HYHWDN  
McDonald 2013, 108; McGaughey and Kenny 2015; Shapcott 2013, 146). Evans himself 
seemed to see domestic policy such as asylum as relevant to good international citizenship 
RQO\LQVRIDUDVDVWDWH¶VFUHGLELOLW\DVDJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQGHSHQGVSDUWO\Rn keeping 
LWV µGRPHVWLFKRXVHDEVROXWHO\ LQRUGHU¶ZKLFKFDQ LQYROYHD MXVW UHIXJHHDQG LPPLJUDWLRQ
policy (Evans 1989, 15-16). Beyond this link, which is an artefact of Australian politics of 
recent decades, recent academic work has explored how practices of good international 
citizenship abroad have domestic pre-requisites, with Shapcott (2013) exploring the ways in 
ZKLFK VWDWHV PD\ WDNH µD FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SDWK¶ WR JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQVKLS +RZHYHU
these links made between good international citizenship and domestic policy stop short of 
fully viewing such policy as part of this citizenship, instead viewing domestic policy only as 
a pre-requisite for it.viii 
However, the basic claim that asylum should be seen as forming part of good 
international citizenship is hardly controversial, for it flows directly from the good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQ¶V FRPPLWPHQW WRKXPDQ ULJKWV DQG WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZZKLFK LQFOXGHV
the 1951 Refugee Convention and other instruments which provide for the protection of 
refugees. TKH JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQ¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR PXOWLODWHUDOLVP PLJKW DOVR EH
thought to entail some willingness to share the collective responsibility to protect refugees 
WKURXJK SK\VLFDO UHVHWWOHPHQW VFKHPHV DQG ILQDQFLDO µEXUGHQ-VKDULQJ¶ 7KHUH LV KRZHYHr, 
much more than this to say here, and the neglect of domestic policies such as asylum in 
discussions of good international citizenship has persisted despite the existence of 
sophisticated work from an English School perspective on the role of asylum in international 
society (Haddad 2008; Hurrell 2011). Without drawing on the notion of good international 
FLWL]HQVKLS H[SOLFLWO\ (PPD +DGGDG IRU LQVWDQFH KDV H[SORUHG DV\OXP¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK
pluralist and solidarist norms underpinning international society. While the institution of 
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asylum flows more naturally from solidarist principles of good international citizenship which 
VWUHVVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIKXPDQULJKWV+DGGDG¶VZRUNGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWDUDWLRQDOHIRUDV\OXP
can be found within pluralist norms. Asylum is a means of maintaining the stability of 
international society and reinforcing its statist logic, in that it seeks to reabsorb refugees ± 
who, by fleeing, have disrupted the initial distribution of responsibility for their rights to their 
states of origin ± LQWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\WKURXJKDSURFHVVRIµUHWHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ¶+DGGDG
0RUHRYHUDV\OXPPD\ IXQFWLRQDVD µFRUUHFWLYHPHFKDQLVP¶ IRU WKHZRUNLQJVRI
international society that foreseeably creates refugees (Haddad 2008, 88; see also Clark 2013, 
ch. 4; Carens 2013, 195). In other words, asylum can be an important element of the practice 
of good international citizens, whether pluralist or solidarist norms are dominant within that 
society. 
It might be asked why the focus here is on asylum, rather than other forms of refugee 
SURWHFWLRQ DQG DVVLVWDQFH WKDW FDQ EH GHOLYHUHG ZLWKLQ UHIXJHHV¶ UHJLRQV RI RULJLQ VXFK DV
humanitarian aid packages or the creation of safe havens, which may be more efficient (see 
Price 2009, 12-13). Without discounting the role of these forms of in situ protection and 
assistance entirely, and recognising that good international citizenship may involve taking 
these measures, it is important to recognise that they are often an inadequate substitute for 
asylum. Aid, which is often delivered in refugees camps, can be an important short-term 
palliative by offering shelter and subsistence but, unlike asylum, it cannot secure the full range 
of human rights within a state to which refugees should have access. 
While the basic case that asylum should be seen as forming part of the code of good 
international citizenship should be easy to make out, recognition of the role of asylum in this 
citizenship is especially important given the frequent practical limitations of humanitarian 
LQWHUYHQWLRQDVDPHDQVRIXSKROGLQJVWDWHV¶53$V ,QRZDUJXH WKH IDFW WKDW LQWHUYHQWLRQ 
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can be imprudent or politically impossible without violating the procedural norms of 
international society, and can create its own refugees, renders asylum an especially crucial 
element of good international citizenship. 
 
Asylum and Humanitarian Intervention 
Discussions of good international citizenship, and especially those informed by a 
strongly solidarist ethos, have tended to focus on humanitarian intervention as the principal 
means of upholding human rights (e.g. Dunne 2008; Linklater 2000). Some have sought to 
incorporate a demanding duty of intervention within the framework of good international 
citizenship, with Wheeler and Dunne (2001, 184) arguing tKDW LQ µNLOOLQJ WR GHIHQG KXPDQ
rights, the good international citizen must be prepared to ask its soldiers to risk and, if 
QHFHVVDU\ORVHWKHLUOLYHVWRVWRSFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\¶7KLVOLQNLVSDUWO\GXHWRWKHIDFW
that the frameworks of good international citizenship and R2P have been part of the same 
broad normative and political trajectory. In addition to the fact that they both stem from the 
human rights culture that has developed since the end of World War Two, Gareth Evans has 
been a firm advocate of both. As co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, whose report presented the concept of R2P in 2001, his vision of both 
R2P and good international citizenship stressed intervention as a principal means of tackling 
mass atrocity crimes. 
At this juncture, advocates of good international citizenship have faced a strong tension 
between respect for procedural norms in international society, and recognition of the need to 
deliver the substantively just outcome of protection for those vulnerable to atrocity crimes. 
Indeed, in the wake of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Linklater regarded the question of whether to 
intervene in cases of grave humanitarian emergency without UN Security Council  
17 
 
DXWKRULVDWLRQ DV µWKH IXQGDPHQWal dilemma for the good international citizen at the present 
WLPH¶/LQNODWHU+HUHWKHJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶VYDOXHVRIKXPDQULJKWVDQG
multilateralism seem to enter into direct conflict. The problem is even more acute where 
unauthorised intervention risks generating competition among great powers and undermines 
international order. Intervening without authorisation might avert atrocities in the short-term, 
but in the longer-term it may lead to the emergence of what Ralph and Gallagher (2015) have 
GXEEHGµOHJLWLPDF\IDXOWOLQHV¶LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\RUSURPSWDµSOXUDOLVWEDFNODVK¶5DOSK
2007, 56), as states which are strongly committed to pluralist norms of non-interference may 
become highly wary of future interventions. Arguably, NA72¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ/LE\DLQ
ZKLFK H[FHHGHG WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO¶V PDQGDWH WR SURWHFW FLYLOLDQV E\ SXUVXLQJ UHJLPH
change, has to some extent contributed to this kind of backlash when it has come to the 
prospect of intervention in response to the subsequent crisis in Syria. As well as being 
politically unfeasible without acting outside the established procedures of international society, 
intervention may often simply be imprudent or, in the language of just war theory, not stand a 
reasonable chance of success. Intervention risks further inflaming already highly volatile 
situations, claiming civilian lives and precipitating or accelerating further refugee crises. As 
'XQQHKDVSXWLWµ>D@NH\GLPHQVLRQRIJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSLVFRnfronting 
PRUDOOLPLWVDVZHOODVSRVVLELOLWLHV¶VXFKWKDWµ>L@QPDQ\FDVHV¶RIKXPDQLWDULDQGLVDVWHUµLW
may be prudent not WRDFW¶HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
One upshot of the focus on humanitarian intervention in discussions of good 
international citizenship has been that domestic policies, such as asylum policy, that can help 
to navigate the tensions and controversies inherent in such intervention have been overlooked. 
While, as I have shown, a willingness to offer asylum to refugees is entailed by the good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRKXPDQULJKWVDVDPDWWHURIFRXUVHLWEHFRPHVDQHYHQ
more important tool in the toolkit of good international citizens in this kind of 
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VFHQDULR DORQJVLGH RWKHU µVRIW¶ PHDVXUHV VXFK DV GLSORPDF\ that also fall within the good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRPXOWLODWHUDOLVP%ULQJLQJJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLS
home, so to speak, through a strong asylum policy is one way of making good on good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQV¶ FRPPLWPHQW WR KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG 53 Zhere military measures are 
unfeasible. As solidarist good international citizens seek to mitigate or even eliminate the 
tension between proceduralism and substantive justice by engaging in the incremental task of, 
LQ /LQNODWHU¶V ZRUGV µSHUVXDGLQJ WKH UHVW of the international community to adopt a new 
OHJDOLW\ FRQFHUQLQJ KXPDQLWDULDQ ZDUV¶ /LQNODWHU   DV\OXP EHFRPHV HYHQ PRUH
important as an interim measure.ix 
This way of understanding the relationship between asylum and intervention is distinct 
from how scholars who focus on asylum and refugee protection have approached the two. For 
instance, while Dowty and Loescher (1996) have seen refugee crises as potential grounds for 
military intervention, Matthew Price (2009, 70) has argued that asylum and intervention bear a 
µIDPLO\UHODWLRQVKLS¶ZLWKHDFKRWKHUDQGDUHSDUWRIDVSHFWUXPRISROLF\UHVSRQVHVWKDWVHHNWR
reform persecutory or otherwise illegitimate states. Price (2009, 77) suggests that, where 
human rights abuses are severe and flagrant and WKHQXPEHUVRIUHIXJHHVULVHJUHDWO\µPLOLWDU\
LQWHUYHQWLRQ EHFRPHV D YLDEOH VXEVWLWXWH IRU DV\OXP¶ +RZHYHU LQ FDVHV ZKHUH VXFK
intervention is imprudent or politically off the table, the order is reversed, so to speak, and it is 
asylum that becomes an important substitute for intervention. This is not to imply that 
intervention and asylum can exactly achieve the same goals, for while asylum can only protect 
individuals at risk from abuses committed elsewhere rather than tackle them at source, at best 
intervention will be able to avert them (although, whereas asylum can offer immediate 
protection, intervention may exacerbate conflict before it has any positive impact, if indeed it 
has any at all). It is to recognise that, where intervention would be counterproductive, asylum 
assumes an even greater importance in the repertoire of good international citizens. 
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This has important implications for the framing of the R2P norm in international 
society. In common with good international citizenship, R2P has also been understood as 
being solely or mainly a foreign policy issue for liberal states (Welsh 2014, 3), and has 
developed independently of the tradition of international refugee law that has been established 
in modern international society. This separation of R2P and asylum is quite artificial, given 
the obvious ability of asylum to fulfil R2P by offering protection from atrocity crimes within 
the territory of other states (Barbour and Gorlick 2008; Bulley 2010; Gilgan 2015; Straehler 
2012; Ralph and Souter 2015). More generally, Ian Clark (2013, 154) has observed the 
process within international society of 
macro-categorization into...individual issue areas ± violence, climate, movement, and 
health ± as if each is separate and discrete...The powerful additional impact it has had is 
to present each as if it were self-contained, and to design it in virtual detachment from 
the self-evident mutual interdependencies that exist among those various regimes. This 
is, of course, wholly artificial and the source of yet another layer of problems for the 
people who have to negotiate their way through them. 
Although Clark does not draw an explicit moral conclusion from this, it is no great leap 
from this observation to argue that states should seek to overcome these artificial 
compartmentalisations, in order to minimise and correct the vulnerabilities that the operation 
of international society foreseeably creates. In the context of R2P, this means recognising that 
GHFODUDWLRQV RI 53¶V IDLOXUH RU XQWLPHO\ GHDWK HJ 5LHII 2011), given the failures of 
intervention, are premature, and enjoins good international citizens to take the lead in recasting 
and reiterating R2P so as to include asylum. Indeed, this potential role for good international 
citizens in tailoring the R2P framework to political developments fits well with the picture of 
middle-SRZHU JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQV HQJDJLQJ LQ µQLFKHGLSORPDF\¶ <RXGHDQG6ODJWHU
2013, 124) and acting as norm entrepreneurs. 
 
Special Responsibilities and Asylum 
In this article so far, I have argued that good international citizenship should be 
explicitly seen as entailing special as well as general responsibilities, and that an inclusive 
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DV\OXPSROLF\VKRXOGIORZIURPWKHJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRKXPDQULJKWV
especially where intervention is unfeasible or would be counterproductive. In the final part of 
this article, I aim to bring these contentions together, suggesting that asylum becomes an even 
more important element of good international citizenship where intervention produces 
refugees, which may lead states to acquire special responsibilities to protect those refugees. 
Good international citizenship, I also suggest, involves rectifying the inequitable distribution 
of special responsibilities to protect refugees that currently exists in international society.  
International society arguably already contains its own regime of special 
responsibilities in the domain of asylum and refugee protection. For instance, the principle of 
non-refoulement within the 1951 Refugee Convention ± which bars states from returning 
refugees to situations where their life or freedom would be endangered ± effectively distributes 
among states a special responsibility to protect refugees when they have reached their territory. 
This renders UHIXJHHV¶ proximity to another state a powerful criterion for distributing 
responsibilities to refugees (Gibney 2000). Moreover, through voluntary repatriation ± which 
LV SXUVXHGE\ WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV+LJK&RPPLVVLRQHU IRU5HIXJHHV 81+&5DV D µGXUDEOH
VROXWLRQ¶ WR GLVSODFHPHQW ± the refugee regime seeks to uphold the initial distribution of 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH ZRUOG¶V SRSXODWLRQ E\ DIILUPLQJ WKH FRQWLQXLQJ UHVSRnsibilities of 
UHIXJHHV¶VWDWHV-of-origin towards their estranged citizens. 
There is, however, a strong case for arguing that, in order to be full good international 
citizens, states need to go beyond these existing and imperfect allocations of special 
responsibilities for refugees. For one thing, this regime of special responsibilities contains 
strong protection norms for certain displaced persons, namely the persecuted, while containing 
only weak obligations to those displaced by other factors such as war, severe socio-economic 
deprivation, and environmental change (Betts 2013). The non-refoulement principle effectively 
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incentivises the array of non-arrival measures that Western states have erected in recent 
decades to prevent the arrival of refugees on their territory where the principle would kick in, 
which ensure that two thirds of the global refugee population remains in the global South, 
within states that are far less able to offer effective protection to refugees (Gibney 2015, 2). 
The strength of the non-refoulement principle stands in contrast to the weakness of any 
µEXUGHQ-VKDULQJ¶QRUm which would oblige states to participate in resettlement schemes (Betts 
2009, 3), in which states offer permanent residence to refugees who are residing in a state of 
first asylum that is unable to offer adequate protection to them.  
The currently skewed distribution of special responsibilities to protect refugees across 
international society should lead us to call the close association in the scholarly literature 
between good international citizenship and Western liberal democracies into question. This is 
because some states within the global South act, judged by the numbers of refugees they 
protect, more in accordance with the principles of good international citizenship and R2P than 
many liberal-democratic states, and thereby arguably practice a domain-specific form of this 
citizenship. Indeed, certain states neighbouring Syria KDYH EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV µKHURLFDOO\¶
fulfilling their R2P by accepting millions of Syrian refugees in recent years (Welsh 2013), 
while European states have received only around ten per cent of those refugees (UNHCR 
2016). 
This has important implications for our understanding of the principal actors involved 
in upholding R2P. Although some non-Western states are closely aligned to pluralist norms 
(Newman 2013, 241) and have tended to be wary of a Western-driven interventionist agenda 
that they perceive within R2P, recognition not only of the role of asylum in R2P, but also of 
the burdens of refugee protection borne by certain non-Western states, demonstrates that R2P 
need not be seen as the sole preserve of Western liberal democracies.x 
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Nevertheless, it is important not to exaggerate the good international citizen credentials 
of refugee-hosting states within the global South, for several reasons. First, many of these 
states fulfil their R2P by accepting refugees only in effect rather than as a result of a clear 
intention, given that R2P and asylum have been seldom linked by such states and, in the case 
of states hosting large numbers of Syrian and Iraqi refugees, may be motivated more by 
cultural and religious affinity (Chatty 2013). Second, their welcoming of refugees may say 
more about their limited capacity to control their borders than the commitment to R2P and 
international refugee law that is strongly associated with good international citizenship, as 
some of these states have not signed or ratified the Refugee Convention. 
In addition to working towards an improved assignment of special responsibilities to 
protect refugees and to rectify the currently inequitable distribution of refugees across 
international society, the status of any state as a good international citizen will depend on its 
readiness to discharge any reparative special responsibilities it may bear towards refugees. 
After all, liberal-democratic states have, in recent decades, caused, contributed to, accelerated 
or created the conditions for various refugee crises in areas such as Kosovo, Iraq and Libya 
through their military interventions. According to the widely held principle of reparation, 
states bear an obligation to offer refugees they have created the most fitting form of reparation 
that is available to them, which may often be in the form of asylum (Souter 2014). For 
instance, in the case of Iraq, the invasion of 2003 by several purported good international 
citizens led to the collapse of the Iraqi state and set the stage for mass displacement, both 
during the civil war that engulfed Iraq from 2006 until 2007, and as a result of the rise of 
Islamic State in 2014. Moreover, the removal of Colonel Gaddafi from power in Libya in 
2011, made possible by NATO airstrikes, has left a power vacuum and created the conditions 
for civil war and displacement.xi  
In keeping with the abstract argument concerning the role of special responsibilities in 
23 
 
good international citizenship outlined in the second part of this article, the failure of the 
intervening states to discharge their reparative special responsibilities to the refugees for 
whose flight they bear responsibility has not only constituted an injustice to those refugees 
themselves, but also an inter-state injustice (see also Gibney 2015).xii This is because, if states 
that create refugees choose not to discharge their special responsibilities towards them, the 
costs of protecting them of course do not simply vanish, but instead are inevitably borne by 
other states that often do not bear reparative responsibilities to them. An example of this was 
the reception of the majority of Iraqi refugees in the years following the US-led invasion by 
neighbouring states (Sassoon 2009). However, such inter-state injustices also emerged among 
liberal-democratic states. For instance, in 2006 and 2007 the Swedish town of Södertälje 
accepted nearly twice the number of Iraqi refugees taken by the US (Sassoon 2009, 102). 
While the willingness of other states to offer asylum to refugees created by the actions of other 
third-party states varies, the issue of fairness has been cited by various states as a reason for 
eventually limiting their contributions to international refugee protection. For instance, a 
Syrian official ± VSHDNLQJ EHIRUH 6\ULD¶V civil war, during which period the country was a 
haven for large numbers of Iraqis ± LVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJWKDWµ>Z@HNHHSUHPLQGLQJWKH86WKDW
without this war there would be no refugees. The U.S. is not PHHWLQJ LWV UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶
,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULVLV *URXS   ZKLOH 6ZHGHQ¶V 0LJUDWLRQ 0LQLVWHU SRLQWHG RXW WKDW
SwedHQ¶V LQWDNH RI ,UDTL UHIXJHHV ZDV µHTXLYDOHQW RI >VLF@ WKH 86 WDNLQJ LQ DERXW 
UHIXJHHV¶TXRWHGLQ%DQWD6LPLODUO\WKH0D\RURI6|GHUWlOMHVWDWHGWKDWµ:HDUHD
VPDOO WRZQ LQ D VPDOO FRXQWU\ :H GLGQ¶W VWDUW WKH ZDU ,W ZDV WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG *UHDW
%ULWDLQ 7KH\ PXVW QRZ WDNH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH UHIXJHHV¶ TXRWHG LQ -RUGDQ  ,Q
-DFNVRQ¶VWHUPVWKLVUHSUHVHQWVQRWRQO\DIDLOXUHWRGLVFKDUJHµKXPDQLWDULDQUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶
WR UHIXJHHV EXW DOVR D PDWWHU RI µLQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ WRZDUGV RWKHU VWDWHV -DFNVRQ
2000, 173). 
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Conclusion 
In this article, I have sought to advance debates over the content of good international 
citizenship and to address a residual indeterminacy within the concept by demonstrating that 
good international citizenship is not restricted to general duties in the realm of foreign policy, 
but involves discharging special responsibilities to protect, which in turn involves grants of 
asylum to refugees. Seeking to fill this gap in theorising on the good international citizen, I 
called attention to the clear links between good international citizenship and asylum, and 
argued that recognising and sustaining these links is especially important given the practical 
limitations of humanitarian intervention. Good international citizenship involves thinking 
creatively to reshape global norms such as R2P in order to ensure the protection of the 
YXOQHUDEOH DQG HQWDLOV D ZLOOLQJQHVV WR EHDU WKH FRVWV RI RQH¶V DFWLRQV ZKHUH WKH\ FUHDWH
refugees. In this way, I hope to have shown that, although good international citizenship 
remains a relatively conservative framework, and can only take us so far towards the 
achievement of a world order reconstituted along cosmopolitan lines, it demands action that ± 
if taken ± would result in a significant reduction of injustice and unnecessary suffering within, 
and partly stemming from, international society. 
 
 
Bibliography 
%DQWD%5µ-XVWZDUWKHRU\DQGWKH,UDTZDUIRUFHGGLVSODFHPHQW¶Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 21:3, 261-284. 
%DUERXU%DQG*RUOLFN%µ(PEUDFLQJWKH³UHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFW´$UHSHUWRLUHRI
measures including asylum IRUSRWHQWLDOYLFWLPV¶International Journal of Refugee Law, 20:4, 
533±66. 
25 
 
Betts, A. (2009) Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). 
Betts, A. (2013) Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). 
%ODLU7µ'RFWULQHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPXQLW\¶6SHHFKGHOLYHUHGWRWKH&KLFDJR
Economic Club, 24 April. Available at: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297>, accessed 
27 November 2015. 
Bukovansky, M., Clark, I., Eckersley, R., Price, R., Reus-Smit, C. and Wheeler, N.J. (2012) 
Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan). 
%XOOHU-DQG+DUULVRQ9µ1HZ/DERXUDVD³JRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ´QRUPDWLYH
WKHRU\ DQG 8. IRUHLJQ SROLF\¶ LQ 5 /LWWOH DQG 0 :LFNKDP-Jones (eds.) 1HZ /DERXU¶V
Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press), 77-89. 
%XOOH\'µ+RPHLVZKHUHWKHKXPDQLV"(WKLFVLQWHUYHQWLRQDQGKRVSLWDOLW\LQ.RVRYR¶
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39:1, 43-63.  
%XUNH$µ7KHJRRGVWDWHIURPDFRVPLFSRLQWRIYLHZ¶International Politics 50:1, 57-76.  
Butt, D. (2009) Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution 
Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
26 
 
Buzan, B. (2014) An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal 
Approach (Cambridge: Polity).  
Cabrera, L. (2010) The Practice of Global Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Carens, J.H. (2013) The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Chatty, D. (2013) µ*XHVWV DQG +RVWV¶ The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Cairo, American 
University in Cairo. Available at: <http://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/guests-and-hosts/>, 
accessed 5 April 2016. 
Clark, I. (2013) The Vulnerable in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Clark, I. and Reus-6PLW&µ/LEHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPWKHSUDFWLFHRIVSHFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
DQGWKHHYROYLQJSROLWLFVRIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶International Politics, 50:1, 38-56. 
&RFKUDQ0µ7KHHWKLFVRIWKH(QJOLVK6FKRRO¶LQ&5HXV-Smit and D. Snidal (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 286-297. 
&RFKUDQ 0  µ&KDUWLQJ WKH HWKLFV RI WKH (QJOLVK 6FKRRO :KDW ³JRRG´ LV WKHUH LQ D
middle-JURXQGHWKLFV"¶International Studies Quarterly, 53:1, 203-225. 
'HYHWDN 5  µ,Q IHDU RI UHIXJHHV WKH SROLWLFV RI ERUGHU SURWHFWLRQ LQ $XVWUDOLD¶
International Journal of Human Rights 8:1, 101-109. 
'RZW\ $ DQG /RHVFKHU *  µ5HIXJHH IORZV DV JURXQGV IRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWLRQ¶
International Security, 21:1, 43-71. 
'XQQH7µ*RRGFLWL]HQ(XURSH¶International Affairs, 84, 13-28. 
'XQQH 7  µ'LVWULEXWLQJ GXWLHV DQG FRXQWLQJ FRVWV¶ Global Responsibility to Protect, 
5:4, 443±65. 
 
27 
 
Dunne, T. and McDonald, M  µ7KHSROLWLFVRI OLEHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP¶, International 
Politics, 50:1, 1-17. 
Evans, G. (1989) Making Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Australian Fabian Society). 
Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1991) $XVWUDOLD¶V )RUHLJQ 5HODWLRQV LQ WKH :RUOG RI the 1990s 
(Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press). 
*LEQH\0-µ$V\OXPDQGWKHSULQFLSOHRISUR[LPLW\¶Ethics, Place and Environment, 
3:3, 313-17. 
*LEQH\ 0-  µ5HIXJHHV DQG MXVWLFH EHWZHHQ VWDWHV¶ European Journal of Political 
Theory, 14:4, 448-463. 
Gilgan, C. (2015) µ7KHconceptual link between R2P and the refugee protection rHJLPH¶, paper 
SUHVHQWHG DW D ZRUNVKRS HQWLWOHG µ7KH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ WR 3URWHFW DQG WKH 5HIXJHH &ULVLV +RZ
6KRXOG(XURSH5HVSRQG"¶6FKRRO RI3ROLWLFV DQG ,QWernational Studies, University of Leeds, 18 
January 2016.  
*LOPRUH-µ6WLOOD³IRUFHIRUJRRG´"*RRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSLQ%ULWLVKIRUHLJQ
DQGVHFXULW\SROLF\¶British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17:1, 106-129. 
Graham, 6µ*ROGVWDURUERWWRPRIWKHFODVV,V6RXWK$IULFDDJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDO
FLWL]HQ"¶South African Journal of International Affairs, 15:1, 87-97. 
Haddad, E. (2008) The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Honoré, T. (1999) Responsibility and Fault (Oxford: Hart). 
+XUUHOO$µ5HIXJHHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHW\DQGJOREDORUGHU¶LQ$%HWWVDQG*
Loescher (eds) Refugees in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 85- 
104. 
28 
 
International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre). 
International Crisis GURXSµ)DLOHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\,UDTLUHIXJHHVLQ6\ULD-RUGDQDQG
/HEDQRQ¶. Middle East Report No. 77, 10 July. 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/077- 
failed-responsibility-iraqi-refugees-in-syria-jordan-and-lebanon.aspx>, accessed 12 October 
2015. 
Jackson, R. (2000) The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press). 
-RUGDQ0µ,UDTLUHIXJHHVILQG6ZHGHQ¶VGRRUVFORVLQJ¶Washington Post, 10 April. 
Available at: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/09/AR200804090319.htm> 
accessed 12 October 2015. 
.DJDQ6µ&DXVDWLRQDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶American Philosophical Quarterly, 25:4, 293-
302. 
/DZOHU3µ7KHJRRGVWDWH,QSUDLVHRIFODVVLFDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP¶Review of 
International Studies, 31:3, 427-449. 
/DZOHU3µ7KH³JRRGVWDWH´GHEDWHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV¶International Politics, 
50:1, 18-37. 
/LJKWIRRW6µ$JRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ"$XVWUDOLDDWWKH:RUOG6XPPLWRQ
VXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60:3, 457-471. 
29 
 
/LQNODWHU$µ:KDWLVDJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ"¶LQ3.HDOHGEthics and 
Foreign Policy (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin), 21-43. 
/LQNODWHU$µ7KHJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQDQGWKHFULVLVLQ.RVRYR¶LQ$6FKQDEHO
and R. Thakur (eds) Kosovo and the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective 
Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press), 482-495. 
Linklater, A. (2006) µ7KHKDUPSULQFLSOHDQGJOREDOHWKLFV¶Global Society 20:3, 329-343. 
Linklater, A. (2011) The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Linklater, A. and Suganami, H. (2006) The English School of International Relations: A 
Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
0F'RQDOG0µ)RUHLJQSROLF\LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPDQGSROLWLFDOSRVVLELOLW\¶International 
Politics, 50:1, 97-117. 
0F*DXJKH\)DQG.HQQ\0$µ/DVhing out at the UN is not the act of a good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ¶The Conversation, 10 March. Available at: 
<http://theconversation.com/lashing-out-at-the-un-is-not-the-act-of-a-good-international-
citizen-38587>, accessed 12 October 2015. 
1HZPDQ (  µ53 ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU :RUOG 2UGHU¶ Global Responsibility to 
Protect 5, 235±259. 
Pert, A. (2014) Australia as a Good International Citizen (Annandale, New South Wales: The 
Federation Press). 
 
30 
 
Pogge, T.W. (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Rights and Reforms, 
(Cambridge, Polity). 
Price, M.E. (2009) Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Ralph, J.G. (2007) Defending the Society of States: Why America Opposes the International 
Criminal Court and its Vision of World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
5DOSK-*µ5HSXEOLFHPSLUHRUJRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQ",Qternational law and 
$PHULFDQLGHQWLW\¶LQ.&KULVWLHHGUnited States Foreign Policy and National Identity in 
the Twenty-First Century (London and New York: Routledge). 
5DOSK-*DQG*DOODJKHU$µ/HJLWLPDF\IDXOWOLQHVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVRFLHty: the 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFWDQGSURVHFXWHDIWHU/LE\D¶Review of International Studies, 41:3, 553-
573. 
5DOSK-*DQG6RXWHU-µ$VSHFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFW7KH8.$XVWUDOLDDQG
WKHULVHRI,VODPLF6WDWH¶International Affairs, 91:4, 709-724. 
5LHII '  µ53 5,3¶ The New York Times, 7 November. Available at:                                 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?_r=0>, accessed 5 April 2016. 
Sassoon, J. (2009) The Iraqi Refugees: The New Crisis in the Middle East (London: I.B. 
Tauris). 
Scheffler, S. (2001) Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in 
Liberal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
31 
 
6KDSFRWW 5  µ)URP WKH JRRG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FLWL]HQ WR WKe cosmopolitan political 
FRPPXQLW\DFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSDWK¶International Politics, 50:1, 138-157. 
6LQLYHU$DQG&DEUHUD/µ³*RRGFLWL]HQ(XURSH´DQGWKH0LGGOH(DVWSHDFHSURFHVV¶
International Studies Perspectives, 16, 210-228. 
Souter, J. (20 µ7RZDUGV D WKHRU\ RI DV\OXP DV UHSDUDWLRQ IRU SDVW LQMXVWLFH¶ Political 
Studies, 62:2, 326-342. 
6WUDHKOHU &  µ7KLQNLQJ DERXW SURWHFWLQJ WKH YXOQHUDEOH ZKHQ WKLQNLQJ DERXW
LPPLJUDWLRQ LV WKHUH D ³UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR SURWHFW´ LQ LPPLJUDWLRQ UHJLPHV"¶ Journal of 
International Political Theory 8: 1-2, 159-171. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2016) Syria Regional Refugee 
Response. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, available at: 
<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>, accessed 4 April 2016.  
9LFNHUV5µ/DERXU¶V6HDUFKIRUD7KLUG:D\LQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\¶LQ5/LWWOHDQG0
Wickham-Jones (eds.) 1HZ /DERXU¶V )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ $ 1HZ 0RUDO &rusade? (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press), 33-45. 
:HOVK -  3UHVHQWDWLRQ DW D ZRUNVKRS HQWLWOHG µ7KH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ WR 3URWHFW DQG WKH
&ULVHVLQ/LE\DDQG6\ULD¶8QLYHUVLW\RI:HVWPLQVWHU/RQGRQ'HFHPEHU 
Welsh, J. (20 µ)RUWUHVV (XURSH DQG WKH 53 )UDPLQJ WKH ,VVXH¶ SUHVHQWHG DW µ7KH
/DPSHGXVD'LOHPPD*OREDO)ORZVDQG&ORVHG%RUGHUV:KDW6KRXOG(XURSH'R"¶(XURSHDQ
University Institute, Florence, 17-18 November. 
:KHHOHU1-DQG'XQQH7µ*RRGLQWHUQDWLonal citizenship: a third way for British foreign 
SROLF\¶International Affairs, 74, 847-70.  
32 
 
:KHHOHU1-DQG'XQQH7µ%ODLU¶V%ULWDLQDIRUFHIRUJRRGLQWKHZRUOG"¶LQ.(6PLWK
and M. Light (eds) Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 167-184.  
Williams, J. µ*RRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLS¶LQ1'RZHUDQG-:LOOLDPVHGVGlobal 
Citizenship: A Critical Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 41-52.  
<RXGH-5DQG6ODJWHU7+µ&UHDWLQJ ³JRRGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQV´PLGGOHSRZHUVDQG
GRPHVWLFSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 14, 
123-33.  
<SL/*RRGLQ5(DQG%DUU\&µ$VVRFLDWLYHGXWLHVJOREDOMXVWLFHDQGWKHFRORQLHV¶, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37:2, 103-135.
33 
 
34 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
37 
 
38 
 
39 
 
40 
 
41 
 
42 
 
43 
 
44 
 
45 
 
46 
 
47 
 
48 
 
49 
 
50 
 
51 
 
52 
 
53 
 
54 
 
55 
 
 
                                                 
i
 I would like to thank Jason Ralph, Laura Considine, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 
on earlier versions of this article. )XQGLQJ IRU WKLV UHVHDUFK ZDV PDGH DYDLODEOH E\ 5HVHDUFK &RXQFLOV 8.¶V
µ5LJKWVDQG(WKLFVLQD6HFXULW\&RQWH[W¶SURJUDPPHJUDQWQXPEHU(6/ 
ii
 )RULQVWDQFH%XOOHUDQG+DUULVRQKDYHDUJXHGWKDWµFRQFHSWXDODPELJXLW\¶ZLWKLQdiscussions of good 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSVXFKDVWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµvital QDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶µUXQVWKHULVNRIJLYLQJSROLF\-makers a 
OLFHQFHWRRYHUULGHHWKLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVZKHQLWLVFRQYHQLHQWIRUWKHP¶HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
iii
 In similar vein, Dunne and McDonald (2013, 5) point to candidate states ± such as Qatar, Singapore and China 
± IRUWKHWLWOHRIµLOOLEHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVWV¶ 
iv
 For an overview of the pluralist/solidarist debate, see Buzan 2014, Part III. 
v
 ,Q%X]DQ¶V WHUPLQRORJ\, good LQWHUQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSPD\EHXQDEOH WRVWUHWFKPXFKEH\RQGD µVWDWH-centric 
VROLGDULVP¶ (Buzan 2014, 115). 
vi
 +RZHYHU$QGUHZ/LQNODWHU¶VZRUNZKLFKYLHZVVWDWHV¶DGKHUHQFHWRZKDWKHGXEVWKHµKDUPSULQFLSOH¶DVD
core part of good international citizenship, can be seen as paving the way towards greater recognition of the role 
of special responsibilities within good international citizenship. Linklater views the harm principle as primarily 
being a duty of non-PDOHILFHQFH WKDW LV WR µGRQRKDUP¶ /LQNlater 2006; Linklater 2011, ch. 2; Linklater and 
Suganami 2006, ch. 7). Although Linklater sees the harm principle as involving positive duties of assistance as 
ZHOO DV QHJDWLYH GXWLHV RI µIRUEHDUDQFH¶ /LQNODWHU   DQG RFFDVLRQDOO\ PHQWLRQV UHSDUation and 
compensation in his work on harm in world politics (Linklater 2011, 76), he does not appear to see reparative 
obligations as a core part of the harm principle. It is, however, not difficult to see how a violation of the harm 
principle could, in common moral thought, give rise to a special responsibility to redress that harm. 
vii
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.  
viii
 In fact, asylum and the figure of the refugee challenges any simple distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy $V (PPD +DGGDG    KDV FRQYLQFLQJO\ DUJXHG JLYHQ WKDW µ>W@KH UHIXJHH LV DW WKH WKUHVKROG
EHWZHHQLQVLGHDQGRXWVLGH¶DV\OXP lies µEHWZHHQGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFVDQGEULQJVWRWKHIRUHWKH
LQWHUGHSHQGHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZR¶ 
ix
 Dan Bulley (2010) has powerfully shown the potential consequences of viewing intervention and hospitality as 
mutually exclusive, demonstrating the ways in which the possibilities of action in response to the crisis in Kosovo 
in the late 1990s were narrowly constructed in Britain, resulting in very few Kosovans being granted asylum in 
the UK. 
x
 I am also grateful to an anonymous reviewer for prompting this point. 
xi
 Incorporating recognition of reparative obligations towards refugees into the framework of good international 
citizenship throws up epistemic questions concerning causality, for establishing a VWDWH¶V special responsibility 
towards DJURXSRIUHIXJHHVZLOOUHTXLUHWKHGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIFDXVDOOLQNVEHWZHHQWKDWVWDWH¶VDFWLRQVDQG those 
UHIXJHHV¶IOLJKW While a full discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this article, although such causal 
links can be highly direct in cases of military intervention, even in this kind of case there are potential 
complexities, given that intervention may enable refugee-producing behaviour of internal actors rather than 
produce refugees directly.  
xii
 If those refugees preferred asylum in a state with no reparative duties to them, then responsible states may 
alternatively offer asylum through financial compensation. 
